Insights

What stronger subsea security legislation will mean offshore

November 13th 2026

The government’s recent White Paper on critical undersea infrastructure caught my attention because it brings questions we regularly consider in offshore engineering into the wider discussion about national security. Its proposals are still subject to consultation, but they give us a useful reason to look at how we identify vulnerabilities, monitor changing conditions and decide what protection is appropriate. In this piece, I explore what that could mean in practice for asset owners and where Tekmar’s experience can contribute.

What stronger subsea security legislation will mean offshore

An operator can know where a cable was installed without knowing how well it is protected today. Seabed movement may have reduced its cover, conditions along the route may have changed, and the assumptions used to design its protection may need revisiting. As the UK considers stronger legislation for critical undersea infrastructure, these are the practical questions that asset owners will need to address alongside the growing concern about deliberate interference.

The government’s October White Paper, Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience, proposes stronger criminal penalties, new security and resilience duties for subsea telecoms providers, powers to direct action on national security grounds, and regulation of fibre-optic sensing technologies. These remain proposals subject to consultation. Their engineering significance lies in the expectation that operators should understand their vulnerabilities, take proportionate measures to address them and be prepared to respond when something goes wrong.

The scope needs careful reading. The proposed criminal framework covers telecommunications cables, electricity interconnectors and pipelines, while the new provider duties and national security direction powers focus on subsea telecommunications. Physical resilience measures for the energy network are being considered separately. For offshore energy developers, the paper nevertheless raises a familiar question: how convincingly can the project demonstrate that its protection strategy matches the conditions and threats the asset will encounter?

A useful way to approach that question is through identification, monitoring and deterrence, with a clear connection between the information collected and the action it supports. These activities involve different organisations and different kinds of expertise. Government has responsibilities for intelligence and enforcement; owners retain responsibility for their assets; specialist technology providers can supply detection systems. Engineering connects the assessment of physical vulnerability with decisions about where and how protection should be provided.

Identification starts with an accurate understanding of the asset and its surroundings. Route information, ground conditions and installation records need to be considered alongside subsequent surveys and the history of interventions. An asset register may record that protection was installed, but an engineering assessment needs to establish what it was designed to withstand and whether those assumptions remain valid. It also needs to consider the consequences of a failure, because a section that is relatively straightforward to repair may warrant a different response from one where access and reinstatement would be difficult.

This is where Tekmar’s Engineering Services have a direct contribution to make. Integrated ground modelling, route engineering, cable burial risk assessment and burial and trenching assessments help owners understand a certain level of physical and anthropogenic risk, and evaluate practical mitigation. For new developments, undertaking this work while route and installation options remain open gives the project more ways to address a problem. For existing infrastructure, the equivalent task is to review the available evidence against the original design and establish where further investigation or remedial protection is justified.

Monitoring should then test whether that understanding remains sound. Periodic surveys can help establish changes in seabed conditions or protection, while sensing technologies can provide information about activity around an asset. The White Paper discusses the potential of fibre-optic sensing to provide earlier warning of hazards and interference. It also recognises that the information gathered may itself be sensitive, proposing controls over deployments and the security of the data they produce. Its proposed sensing framework includes relevant deployments on fibres within both data and energy cables, with exclusions for certain other uses.

For an operator, the value of an alert depends on what happens next. Someone must assess its significance, decide whether further investigation is required and have the authority to initiate a response. Engineering information can support that judgement by establishing the asset’s condition and the protection available at the location concerned. A monitoring system and a physical protection design should therefore be considered together, with responsibilities agreed between the owner, engineering team, technology suppliers and the relevant authorities. Tekmar’s contribution is strongest in the assessment and protection of the asset; any wider monitoring offer would require clearly defined specialist capabilities and interfaces.

Deterrence requires similar clarity. Stronger penalties seek to discourage harmful conduct, and effective detection and enforcement can increase the likelihood that those responsible are identified. Physical protection has a different, complementary purpose: to reduce the asset’s vulnerability to the threats for which it has been designed. Burial or an engineered protection system may make some forms of interference more difficult, but a product designed for a particular mechanical load should not be presented as protection against every form of deliberate attack. The threat assessment must establish what protection can reasonably achieve and what risk remains.

Tekmar’s concrete protection and stabilisation products, together with its wider asset protection capabilities, are relevant to that physical engineering work. Depending on the application, an assessment may identify a requirement for supplementary protection or support, followed by detailed design and an installation plan. The choice needs to account for the asset, seabed conditions and the loads being considered, as well as inspection and future repair access. Specifying additional material without resolving those questions would provide a poor basis for claiming improved security.

Recovery also deserves attention before an incident occurs. Even a well-designed protection strategy leaves residual risk, and the White Paper explicitly addresses preparation, response and recovery. Operators need reliable records and an agreed route from detecting a problem to assessing damage and undertaking repairs. Engineering and protection suppliers should be involved in that planning where their designs, products or installation requirements could affect the work. Decisions made during procurement can influence how readily an asset can be accessed and reinstated years later.

For Tekmar, the potential opportunity is in the work that a more demanding approach to resilience could generate: reviewing existing protection, resolving gaps in ground information and designing justified interventions. Whether that becomes additional expenditure will depend on the final legislation, subsequent technical requirements and the investment decisions of individual owners. The immediate case for engagement is more practical. Developers and operators already have assets to protect, and they can assess the quality of their evidence without waiting for every regulatory detail to be settled.

Tekmar can help owners examine that evidence and turn identified physical risks into an engineering scope. For a new cable route, that may mean testing burial and protection assumptions before installation contracts are fixed. For an operational asset, it may mean reviewing changed conditions and assessing the need for intervention. The starting point is a clear account of what is known about the asset, what its existing protection can achieve and which questions still need answering.

 

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